The decline of the "West" and the loss of U. S. global 
triggered a debate about the decline of U.S. hegemony. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the neoliberal transformation of the global economic order opened a new cycle of economic growth and contributed to scepticism about U.S. decline, but the onset of the Great Recession in 2008 renewed the debate about U.S. decline.
The debate has taken different forms. In the United States, Niall Ferguson (2013 ), Francis Fukuyama (2014 and others have argued that deep political cleavages in the United States and the inability of U.S. leaders to find a compromise between the Republican Right and the Democratic Left has contributed to decline. Joseph Stiglitz (2015) has argued that Ferguson and Fukuyama neglect the importance of social and racial cleavages, which have prevented an effective political compromise. Fukuyama thinks an "external shock" might help to re-forge national unity.
Other scholars have blamed decline on the loss of U.S. manufac turing capacities, which deprived industry of its central role in the economy (Srkabec 2014).
The outsourcing of western manufacuting to cheaper production sites in the Global South contributged to the rise of "Newly Industrializing Countries." Although outsourcing was designed to overcome the profit squeeze of the 1970s, it contributed to the decline of old industrial core regions, which were characterized by structural unemployment, population loss, and social despair.
It undermined the (relative) social peace between capital and labor and led to the decline of the Fordist welfare state. The decline of industry in the West led to deep social and regional disparities and discouraged citizens from believing in the political system of liberal democracy.
Although states in Western Europe belonged to the core, they did not occupy a hegemonic position in it. For a time, some officials in Western Europe hoped that the decline of the United States might contribute to the rise of Western Europe, which might then share hegemony with the United States or eventually replace it with an expanded Western Europe. But close economic, military, and political ties did not allow Western Europe to break from U.S. supremacy or assert any real autonomous power On a geopolitical level, the debate about U.S. decline is linked to a debate about the rise of China (Griffiths and Luciani 2011) . Although scholars agree that China is catching up economically, some are skeptical about China's ability to challenge U.S. advantages in ownership, logistics, R&D, innovation and the mobilization of its soft power. Analysts like Martin Jacques (2012) and Niall Ferguson argue that China's economic rise will enable it to assume hegemonic functions in other fields. But scholars like Joseph Nye or Fareed Zacharia question China's ability to rise. They are convinced that China's hegemonic rise will either be undermined by its interna l deficiencies or by the ability of U.S. leaders to turn China in a direction that does not undermine U.S. power. Joseph Nye (2015) posed the question: "Is the American Century over?" He argued that it was not: "The 21 st Century will not be a "Post-American" World." In his view, Americans should not be afraid of decline in economic, military, diplomatic or soft power terms. Chalmers
Johnson, who for years had advocated a strong U.S. position in the Pacific region, changed his views after the Cold War (Johnson 2000 (Johnson , 2004 (Johnson , 2007 (Johnson , 2010 . In the "Blowback Trilogy," Johnson criticized efforts to use military forces to enhance U.S. hegemony because they inevitably led to various forms of resistance or "blowbacks" that created a new form of global empire and promoted a shift from democracy to dictatorship. His argument supported critical voices on the political left, such as Bello (2005) , Galtung (2014), and Harvey (2014) .
While China has been regarded the most likely successor to U.S. hegemony, Russia and India are often neglected. Russia, India, and other Global South states are primarily examined in relation to the rise of China, to consider whether they might help China take a leading role in a multi-po lar Because hegemony is based on economic, military, political and cultural cooperation with core allies, as U.S. hegemony declines, other core states will face serious losses, as economic and political power shifts to states or alliances in the Global South. Conversely, hegemonic decline is restricted to the leading hegemon: the United States. Although non-hegemonic core states are concerned by the loss of U.S. hegemony, some might welcome it because it might give them more room to pursue their economic and political interests.
From a world-system perspective, hegemonic decline refers first to hegemonic shifts from one great power to another, while guaranteeing the political and military framework for the crossborder accumulation of capital. Second, it also refers to the rise and demise of the world-system as a system. The transfer of hegemonic power from the Netherlands to Great Britain and then to the United States took place within the system as a whole. By contrast, the transfer of power from the United States to a successor or a group of successors might change the character of the worldsystem as a system. Scholars now debate whether the current economic crisis and the decline of U.S. hegemonic power marked the end of the capitalist system's capacity to overcome simultaneous economic and hegemonic crises. World-system scholars offer three possible answers about how the current double crisis (of the world-economy and of U.S. hegemony) will affect the world-system as a whole. Frank (1998) argues that crises will lead to continuity. Wallerstein (2013) and Arrighi (2007) argued that it will result in a post-capitalist transformation. And Babones (2016) argues that it will result in the transformation of the world-system into an American world-empire.
To sum up, the decline of the West is a result of changing social and economic relations on a global scale, linked to the restructuring of global commodity chains, the rise of supranatio na l institutions, and the end of welfare and social compromise-both as a reality and as a promise.
The measures taken to restore capital accumulation in times of crisis have changed the foundatio ns on which power relations were built. Governance moved to a transnational class that put pressure on national governments and overruled national bourgeois interests. Transnational institutio ns, which imposed their constitutions and agreements as guidelines for international conduct, replaced decision-making institutions at state and inter-state levels. In the West, the welfare state was dismantled by privatization and commodification, labor regulation replaced by flexibility. The Western welfare state can no longer serve as a goal that fuells the claims of labor activities in global peripheries. Converseley, precarity, heterogeneity and informality, which were typical for peripheral capitalism, became guidelines for the transformation of the former cores. Neoliberal efforts to restore economic growth contributed to social and political erosion.
The United States and the European Union have both experienced social and economic decline. The decline of U.S. political leadership has increased Western European efforts to assert their autonomy, with EU consolidation and enlargement serving as vehicles designed to promote the rise of the European Union. On a military level, U.S. hegemony remains unchallenged. Not even the Western European sea and atomic powers want to leave the NATO alliance, which casts a shadow over the process of EU Eastern Enlargement, as each EU accession is preceded by NATO membership.
While U.S. military power seems unchallenged, Western soft power, another pillar of joint western hegemony, is damaged by the loss of a social promise and by double standards, disappointing potential allies.
Prospects for the West: Three Alternative Options
When figuring out alternative scenarios, one must keep in mind that we speak of ongoing processes that depend on social, political and economic framing; they also represent different politica l projects responding to challenges of decline with regard to all dimensions of hegemonic power.
And they take place simultaneously; they are subject to political competition, eventually provoking severe conflict, which in the case of accelerated crisis may develop into wars and civil wars. They can be observed in all Western states, although geopolitical position, size and distance to specific theatres and relevance of specific issues matter and explain diverging interests and differe nt manifestations in individual states.
Resisting Decline
The most obvious way to avoid decline is to resist it and try to maintain a dominant core or hegemonic position. Resistance can depart from the acknowledging decline; it also can depart from denying decline, denial hence serving as a form of resistance. It is important to differentiate between economic and social resistance, and military resistance.On the economic and social side, the following reactions have been observed. During the global economic crisis of the 1970s, the New International Division of Labor upset the old relation between industrial cores and rawmaterial-producing peripheries. Some of the steps taken to counter the loss of global economic leadership turned out to accelerate decline rather than to slow it.
Monopolizing the market and concentrating production among a small number of big leadfirms was characteristic for almost every sector. The global companies in heavy industry, transport, energy systems and arms were located in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France. They built up global production systems all over the world, which inadvertently helped emerging nations benefit from the shift in manufacturing to the Global South.
At first, outsourcing to low-wage countries was initiated by firms whose operations and industries had passed from high to low profitability during the course of the product-cycle. By selling off non-core businesses, they could concentrate investment on new lead-sectors, which allowed them to control the new product-cycle. Low-skill manufacturing jobs in the core were to be replaced by research and skilled labor, by "post-industrial" or knowledge-based jobs.
In the 1970s and 1980s, information technologies revolutionized manufacturing and communication industries in the core. Firms that failed to introduce new technological and organizational arrangements went bankrupt or were subordinated to the market-leading firms. In the 1990s, a new upswing took off, which built on the neoliberal reforms of the previous period and opened a new round of start-ups in computer applications referred to as the "New Economy." New lead sectors were linked to genetic engineering in biotechnology, food-production, and medicine. At the beginning, product and process innovations seemed valid ways to overcome the challenge of losing manufacturing industries to the advancing semi-peripheries. Joachim Rennstich (2001) argued that the United States had been able to maintain its leading position despite a brief period of hegemonic decline. But the onset of the Great Recession demonstrated that the "New Economy" was a vulnerable and ephemeral development, which benefited only a small group of young enthusiastic entrepreneurs, but did little to create employment in considerable numbers.
Whether profits declined because of overproduction in the 1970s, because of a cyclical profit squeeze, because of multiplying inter-core competition, or because of semi-periphe ra l industrialization, monopolization was seen as a way to boost profits and acquire privileged access to markets. International treaties and trade agreements and trade zones supported this protectionist aim. Efforts to consolidate the European Economic Community (EEC) and strengthen the European Union were designed to strengthen Western Europe vis-à-vis the United States.
Transatlantic partnerships between United States, Canada, and the European Union, currently under negotiation, seek to overcome the protective elements of trade agreements. Transferr ing protectionism to a new, wider scale is a reaction by core states to the new challenges presented by states in the Global South. Although core states have adopted monopolization as a reaction to slipping profits, monopolication has provoked and encouraged anti-western cooperation among states in the South. Resisting decline is also reflected in military mobilization. When hegemony is fading away and there is no single state to replace it, military competition among aspirants grows more intense.
It is quite clear, however, that the decline of U.S. hegemony will not result in the rise of a world empire. An American empire or western alliance that could appease global conflicts is not in sight.
The military cannot be used to arrest economic decline and restore hegemony. On the contrary: the military has contributed to the spread of chaos and conflict (Chossudovsky 2015 , Bello 2005 , Galtung 2014 , and Johnson 2010 It is difficult to imagine the dimension and the pace of such a change. The outcome depends on several of the factors discussed above, including the willingness of the FICs to accept new roles, how much they resist change, and whether they pursue common or separate paths as they adapt to new roles. Changing international relations will affect regional and class relations within states and stimulate the ambitions of willing partners to take over political leadership. The changing political landscape might give rise to secessionist movements and new state formation in the FICs.
These scenarios might sound like fiction. It is easier to think of them as serious options for the future, if we consider the extent to which they have already been implemented. For example, Swiss and German companies have been the leading producers of high-tech textile machines since the end of the nineteenth century. When the textile industry was relocated to the global periphery in the 1970s, they found new export markets. When, with their help, Chinese producers moved up the chain and entered the high-tech fabric segment, the relationship became a more balanced one.
When Chinese owners acquired European companies-as when Jinsheng took over the Swiss
Saurer Company in 2012 (NZZ 5.12.2012)-they took control of the commodity chain. When
Chinese companies eventually relocate apparel manufacturing to contractors at European locations in order to profit from skills, tax incentives and consumer demand, we could speak of a complete reversal of production network control and benefit.
Outsourcing to the Global South to profit from wage and tax differentials was a widespread strategy of western multinational corporations during the global crisis of the 1970s. When state socialism collapsed in 1989 and worker-friendly regulations were abandoned, flexibility and flat taxes pushed western welfare states to become more competitive with low-wage, low-tax locations. Already today we witness the spread of labor leasing or self-employmentreplac ing regular employment; in former European welfare states the nexus between employment and public social security services was cut and social care is becoming commodified. Core states reduced income, company, property, and estate taxes but raised consumer taxes. States, supra-states and international trade and financial institutions adopted neoliberal legislation in individual states.
They also introduced international treaties and agreements to enforce program participation and made financial relief dependent on implementing austerity measures. There is no coordinating centre for anti-systemic forces. They often do not have members,
and it is difficult to specify their numbers or degrees of affiliation. They form networks, meet to demonstrate, and discuss alternatives. Internal conflicts about goals, strategies and cooperation partners are common. Some observers blame anti-systemic movements for being too single-iss ue oriented, too radical, too naïve, too ready to compromise with the system and becoming too easily co-opted (Amin et.al. 1990) . Although they try to build transnational networks, they have troubles to get broader popular support and partcipatation and it is unlikely that their activities will lead to global change.
Therefore it is useful to explore the potentials and constellations for establishing alliances and partnerships for anti-systemic change in the Global South.
In the Global South, various powers oppose Western hegemony and demand more multipolarity of international relations. Governments that represent former liberation movements, indigenous people or leftist programmes (Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador) have cooperated closely with western and global social movements. Leftist ideology does not easily translate into international influence. Conversely, bigger and stronger semi-peripheral states may be better prepared to work with anti-systemic movements to promote change and create a global institutio na l framework that reflects their growing economic strength. The most prominent representatives of a rising semi-peripheral powers are China, India, Russia. They invited Brazil and South Africa to join them in the BRICS. Social activists and scholars debate whether these states should be regarded as anti-systemic forces.
There are big differences among the BRICS members. They have different strategies to control trade (Kappel 2010) . They have all opened their domestic economies to privatizatio n, western FDI, and global production networks and promoted economic transformation. But this has caused social unrest, social protest and political opposition.
Governments have frequently suppressed internal opposition and have not adopted western standards of democracy. By advancing multi-polarity in international relations, they have tried to strengthen their national position, not only vis-a-vis Western powers, but also in relation to other semi-peripheral aspirants. At the same time, they have come under pressure from local opposition movements that have demanded protection from exploitation and a redistribution of wealth. The ascent of semi-peripheral states might result in hegemonic change instead of multi-centric balance, which would serve the interests of small governing elites and oligarchs.
On the one hand, some elites have joined, though they often been rejected by their western counterparts, who are divided over handling international relations with them (Robinson 2015) .
Elites that are willing to promote Western interests are accepted as partners, but elites that pursue their national interests risk being excluded.
Global social movements have debated whether to cooperate with governments to promote change. Social Forums organizers, for example, have excluded government officials and politica l party delegates. Many social movements prefer to cooperate with opposition forces rather than with officials. But they sometimes risk supporting groups and parties that support the West rather than strengthening self-reliant development.
Whatever their political and economic character, states in the BRICS oppose western hegemony (Chase-Dunn and Boswell 2009). Even if their regimes do not adhere to grassroots ideas of social justice and democracy, their opposition to western expansionism has made the world a more diversified and more multi-polar place and created spaces for western anti-syste mic movements. South-South cooperation, which has been promoted by the BRICS and other regional alliances, has the potential to advance political, economic, and financial independence from western-dominated institutions. They also make it less likely that a single power will secure hegemony in the world-system.
Although Western social movements have little political weight, they carry a heavy responsibility in choosing their international allies. The experience of decline, as well as disappointment, distrust and resistance to capitalist growth gives western social movements a leading role in preventing governments and social movements in rising new cores from believing in the promise of growth. It must not be denied that social movements were also misused to join the forces of Western defence. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have often-wittingly or not-served as agents for powerful states or political parties, intervened in social conflicts in the Global South, and transformed these conflicts into an inroad for regime change according to western interests. The "Color Revolutions" were a prominent example of how western governments and their NGO allies used social protests to destabilize semi-peripheral governme nts and prevent the formation of an anti-systemic Global South (Hofbauer 2012) .
On the economic level, western industrial strength has diminished. The semi-peripheral South has grown economically, though it remains trapped in a dependent relationship with western institutions that have adopted new forms of control. International organizations have not recognized this shift, which is why they face growing demands to be more representative. As a result, states in the South have tried to circumvent the western-dominated institutions and create new South-South ones.
On the military level, the United States is still hegemonic, using its capacities to mainta in supremacy. With the exception of Russia, which took over the Soviet military apparatus, no Global
South nation can compete with U.S. and NATO military forces. China's economic ascent has contributed to the built-up of its military capacities, but, like Russia, it lags far behind the United
States and NATO. Dipesh Chakrabarty (2008) argued that the West should abandon its claims of superiority and become "just a province of the world."
Multi-Polarity from Above and from Below
Although the world is becoming multi-polar, it is unclear whether it will be introduced "from above" by new core powers or emerge "from below," as a product of social movements. States that aspire to global hegemonic succession have promoted a multi-polar world that they can introduce "from above." Even if officials in some semi-peripheral states want to secure a global, hegemonic role, it is highly unlikely that any single hegemon will succeed the United States. It is more likely than an alliance of states, which share a vision of balanced relationships, equity and diversity, will work to create multi-polar institutions and persuade the former hegemons to accept and participate in a multi-polarity world. It also depends on the activities of social and politica l movements in the old cores to campaign for such a transition that could avoid violence.
A multi-centric world might also arise from below. The current multiplication of regional armed interventions is a clear signal that any empowerment that rejects the neoliberal consensus has to face suppression. Military interventions by the core may lead to a period of low-intens ive warfare (Chossudovsky 2015) . Think of drone attacks against unwanted persons or armed support for forces, which oppose an unwanted government. Once Western allies and assistant troops develop their own agenda, they can easily turn into the next insurgent, against whom the "international alliance" of United States and NATO is going to operate. Arab integration projects that were on the agenda in the 1970s thus were undermined, delivering a region to hope for Most recently, Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, historians of science at Harvard, presented a view about the coming "collapse of Western civilization" (2014). In prevous work, they explored the reasons for the epistemic neglect of ecological concern by representatives of the scientific community (Oreskes and Conway 2010) . In the "Collapse of Western Civilization" they described an ecological crisis that would lead to the "Great Collapse and Mass Migration" in 2073-2093.
This book transcends conventional analysis and enters the realm of dystopian literature. They argue that the Second People's Republic of China would survive the catastrophe and then restore a stable world order as hegemon. They join people who believe in a solution "from above," and they contribute to the debate about who will follow the United States as a hegemon. governs strictly according to ecological principles and political correctness. After a while, readers learn that "Globalia" does not include the whole world but only parts of it-the privileged regions of the planet that won a great world war. Other parts of the world are excluded and left in a chaotic state. Futurist fiction describes possible outcomes of the current crisis, and offers both "top-down"
and "bottom-up" scenarios. What is likely to unfold is a combination of the two strategies. I conclude with an overview of one possible scenario, which I describe here as economic subsidiarity.
Conclusion: Economic Subsidiarity & Hegemonic Transformation
Economic subsidiarity is a key concept for grassroot, anti-systemic social movements that want to create participatory global integration (Hofbauer and Komlosy 1998) . Proponents of politica l subsidiarity demand the transfer of decision-making from central (federal) bodies to regional and local ones as a way to keep democracy in the people's hands, while excluding business from the political sphere. Economic subsidiarity extends this idea to economic processes, that is, how to create a bottom-up democratic process so that the people can answer economic questions: How do we want to live? What do we need?
How and under what conditions should goods be produced?
Who can afford them?
Economic subsidiarity means giving priority to household and subsistence production over market production; to local over regional, and to regional over national-level production and exchange; and to national over international markets. Economic subsidiarity assigns to large production and distribution units only those processes that cannot be achieved on smaller scales.
Giving priority requires a broad set of legal and financial measurements that support the smaller against the bigger scale of economic activity, privileging or strengthening it vis-à-vis competitio n from bigger or more distant competition respectively.
The concept of economic subsidiarity is a de-growth strategy for developed countries and a modest catching-up strategy for underdeveloped regions. But it does not ignore comparative advantages and block inter-regional division of labor. By giving priority to the smaller units over the bigger units of economic activity and political decision making, economic subsidiarity supports the idea that peripheries and indigenous areas are better prepared to survive global crises, or collapse, as argued by Kuecker and Hall (2007, 2011 ). Wagar's (1999) future desctiption of a decentralized world made up of smaller political units corresponds well with the concept. But it also goes beyond a mere "Small is Beautiful" ideology. Economic susidiarity is a concept that combines a bottom-up strategy of regionalization with a top-down framework that makes regionalization feasible. Economic subsidiarity can only work if it is supported by internatio na l institutions that favor multi-polarity, and if it has the consent and cooperation of national governments and international institutions.
What can western social movements contribute to create economic subsidiarity on a global scale? They can promote the idea that the West will become "just a province" of the world, a development that would transform the "West" from a bloc into multiple regions on different scales .
They can demonstrate modesty and accept that the decisive contribution to global change will originate from the Global South. They can shape public opinion in the West and organize solidarity with movements from the South in order to overcome authoritarian reaction against anti-syste mic struggles for multi-polarity. They can develop networks of mutualism, work to loosen the grip of consumerism, promote de-growth, and provide ecological and ethical arguments to support these developments. They can demonstrate the advantage of "Less is More" in their personal lives.
Finally, anti-systemic movements in the West can work with governments and social movements in the emerging cores to ensure that they do not pursue growth at any social or ecological cost. "Provincializing" the West means abandoning its claim to being the standard-bearer of universal values, preventing the term "province" from being identified as a "backward" place and giving it a new meaning as a respected unit of the world, and accepting diversity, multi-polar ity, and sovereignty in a world of mutual recognition and solidarity, not a world dominated by a single core or hegemon.
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